Publications

NATO faces a doctrinal reckoning. Allied members are investing heavily in uncrewed systems, but the alliance lacks a shared framework for integrating them into a coherent, cross-domain force. Full spectrum drone warfare (FSDW) will define the Third Drone Age,1 and the central question for NATO is not whether to acquire drones but whether it can adapt fast enough to use them effectively. FSDW is not one single technology, but a systems revolution of autonomous air, ground and maritime machines that learn, adapt and fight as one. Going beyond simple acquisition and mass deployment, FSDW is about understanding the novel software layers of the battlefield—layers that are being built to allow next-generation uncrewed systems to operate in conjunction with each other and to integrate seamlessly.

https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/102/4/1415/8726188?login=false

European Journal of International Security (First View)

Assessments regarding the impact of drone technology on the character of war are currently influenced by a group of scholars who note that because drones cannot avoid detection by radar, are difficult to acquire and maintain, and do not eliminate close combat on a battlefield, they remain an ordinary development in the character of war. These arguments misconstrue the drone revolution as an operational event rather than a political one. In contrast, we argue that drones provide certain actors a revolutionary technology in terms of their coercive potential. Under certain circumstances, drone technologies have the potential to provide their owners with the power to force the political capitulation of adversaries. We highlight two recent cases that suggest this potential is real, the Houthi’s 2023 successful compellence of the Saudis to seek rapprochement with Iran, and Ethiopia’s last minute drone acquisition and subsequent routing of the Tigray rebel advance in 2021.

Link (open access)

Journal of Regional Security 18, no. 2 (2023): 135-162.

This paper adapts underbalancing theory to explain regional powers’ decisions when faced with the politics of great power intrusion. The paper finds two situations where regional powers defy expectations and details the causal models using India (1979-1980) and Russia (1996-1999) as illustrative cases. I find underbalancing theory wanting at the regional level. In each case, the regional power performs a variety of diplomatic maneuvers – not limited to balancing and underbalancing – to mitigate the fallout of great power decisions. This is explained by the power asymmetries dividing great and regional powers, both constraining the actions of regional powers while motivating more creative diplomatic practices. It is said that great powers are “Gullivers”, tied down by their many responsibilities. This paper tells a different story, in which obstinate great powers make decisions without consideration for the locale where those decisions are carried out. It is the regional powers that are tied down by geostrategic position and regional security externalities. However weak or strong, these externalities create threats too salient to ignore. The findings suggest international political processes and outcomes can only be comprehensible by accounting for regional contexts and regional powers.

Link (Paywalled)

International Politics 61, no. 1 (2024), 60-82.

How does the interaction of power at the global-regional nexus impact the behavior of regional powers? Neorealism predicts that changes in polarity accompany changes in expectations regarding great power behavior. The cases below consider strategic approaches to crisis mediation pursued by regional powers Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and Russia under conditions of bipolarity, unipolarity, and multipolarity to assess the impact of the international system’s structure on regional power behavior. Consistently, the cases in this article show regional powers adopting roles that seek to preempt great power involvement, regardless of the regional power’s orientation toward the system. Even if different polarities generate variations in uncertainty among great powers at the international level, as neorealism predicts, those variations do not filter any clarity regarding great power intentions down to the regional level. This consistency in regional power behavior may provide a baseline for analysis as emerging multipolarity increases the complexity of regional disputes.

Link (Paywalled)

With Kelly A. Grieco

International Politics 60, no. 4 (2023), 919-943.

Weary of costly on-the-ground military interventions, Western nations have increasingly turned to “Remote Warfare” to address the continued threat of terrorism. Despite the centrality of drone strikes to the practice of Remote Warfare, we still know relatively little about their effectiveness as instruments of coercion. This article offers a conceptual framework for assessing their coercive efficacy in counterterrorism. We argue that remote control drones are fundamentally different from traditional airpower, owing to changes in persistence, lethality, and relative risk. Critically, these technological characteristics produce weaker coercive effects than often assumed. While persistent surveillance combined with lethal, low-risk strikes renders armed drones highly effective at altering the cost–benefit calculations of terrorists, these same technological attributes cause them to be less effective at clear communication, credibility, and assurance—other key factors in coercion success. Overall, drone strikes are poor instruments of coercion in counterterrorism, underscoring some potential limitations of Remote Warfare.

Link (Paywalled)

With Ann Mezzell

The Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 51, no. 2 (2021): 85-96.

Pre-doctrinal deliberations about the employment of the US armed forces, captured in Joint Doctrine Notes, remain critically understudied. Using comparative text analysis, this article identifies changes in recent Joint Doctrine Note depictions of military strategy. These changes risk distorting the logic of military strategy, sacrificing means-ends integration to organizational impulse, and raising the prospect of future shortfalls in US strategic effectiveness.

Link (Free)

With Derrick Frazier

RUSI Journal 163, no. 5 (2018): 38-48.

NATO structures drive the effective socialisation of norms, rules and procedures. The cumulative effect of such structuring precipitates its persistence over time. Focusing on the Tactical Leadership Programme (TLP), we highlight how this programme affects socialisation at the lowest levels. It creates a sense of shared understanding of mission goals and operations through standardised and shared tactics, common equipment and common language. While challenges undoubtedly exist, programmes such as the TLP will continue to function and cumulatively create tactical, operational and strategic advantages that make the future persistence of NATO more likely.

Link (Paywalled)

With Derrick Frazier

Defence Studies17, no. 4 (2017): 379-397.

Multinational Military Exercises (MMEs) are often viewed by states as opportunities to increase interoperability, improve cooperation, and solve common security problems. We argue that in addition to this, MMEs work as tools to shape the shared beliefs of coalition partners surrounding threat. Specifically, MMEs allow multinational forces to identify best practices, consolidate beliefs, and codify behavior through doctrine, typically by means of some institutional process. We examine our argument on MMEs through an analysis of various multinational and coalition partner efforts to identify security threats and cooperate through the development of common doctrine at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Our analysis suggests that the use of MMEs for doctrine development does help to socialize states in terms of identifying common threats and subsequently sharing a process by which to address them.

Link (Paywalled)